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Abstract—A secret can be an encrypted message or a private
key to decrypt the ciphertext. One of the main issues in
cryptography is keeping this secret safe. Entrusting secret to
one person or saving it in a computer can conclude betrayal of
the person or destruction of that device. For solving this issue,
secret sharing can be used between some individuals which a
coalition of a specific number of them can only get access to the
secret. In practical issues, some of the members have more power
and by a coalition of fewer of them, they should know about the
secret. In a bank, for example, president and deputy can have a
union with two members by each other. In this paper, by using
Polar codes secret sharing has been studied and a secret sharing
scheme based on Polar codes has been introduced. Information
needed for any member would be sent by the channel which
Polar codes are constructed by it.
Index Terms—earthquake intensity, multilayer perceptron, im-
perialist competitive algorithm, artificial neural network.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN communication, in most of the cases, secrecy of in-formation is the most important issue. If a person wants
to send an information, he can encrypt it, or by using
steganography the information can be hidden in others view
[15]. The public key encryption is one of the main concepts
in cryptography which has been introduced by Diffie and
Hellman, and it was an answer to key exchanging old problem
and refers to the digital signature [5]. In mathematics, public
key cryptography is known as the one-way function which
uses trapdoor function. For securing an information we can
encrypt it, but for protecting encryption key other ways should
be tried. One way for protecting key is keeping it safe to a
special place (in a computer, in human memory, or in another
safe place). This method is unreliable in that by only one
misfortune (the corruption of computer, sudden death of the
person, or intentional sabotage) the key can be lost. One simple
solution is saving some copies of the key to different places,
but this is also insecure as well (infiltration in computer,
betrayal, or human error). The solution which can answer to
key security or any other secrecy is sharing that secret among
some individuals that only a coalition of a specific number of
them can rebuild the secret. Different kinds of secret sharing
schemes have been introduced which in this paper briefly they
would be described and a new secret sharing scheme based
on Polar codes would be introduced. In section II a review of
different secret sharing schemes has been mentioned and in
section III construction of Polar codes which is suitable for
secret sharing is studied. In section IV Polar code based secret
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sharing is introduced and there are two examples to illustrate
it.
II. SECRET SHARING SCHEME
Assume that a group of 11 scientists wants to securely
preserve their secret information. They can easily settle the
information in a strongbox. Now if they want to install some
locks on strongbox which only by a coalition of six of
them they can open its door, in a combinatorial way the
minimum number of locks and the necessary amount of keys
for any scientists can be determined. This strongbox needs
(11, 6) = 462 locks and any scientist should hold (10, 5) = 252
keys with him [11]. Now if this secret should be shared among
individuals which are a lot more than 11 people, answer to this
issue needs too many locks and keys which its amount would
increase exponentially.
The first and easiest answer to this problem is using only
one lock and giving the key to one person. In confidentiality
aspect, this idea is not good at all. The person can lose the key,
forget the secret, or even he can betray. From the time that
electronic communication has been common in human life, the
value of safe communication has been increased. The notion of
information security for different needs and different purposes
may vary. Anyway, without considering the way which we
use, secrecy is dependent to the key confidentiality which only
legal members should be aware of it.
The necessity of key confidentiality has some arguments like
establishing key secrecy on only one member or one database
can decrease system’s secrecy level to the person or database’s
reputation and if other copies of key do not be available, it
can be lost, or the software or hardware can be damaged. On
the other hand, if the key is held by more than one member,
an enemy would have more flexibility in achieving to the key
which can decrease its security.
Shamir [17] generalized this problem in a way that for a
secret s, the goal is dividing s to N shares like s1, s2, · · · , sN
which only by coalition of t or more than this s′
i
s the
secret be computable and by knowing any of the t − 1 or
fewer shares it would not be possible to understand anything
about secret s. That means all the possible answers for s
have the same probability. This kind of scheme is known
as a (t, n) threshold scheme. Shamir had used polynomial
interpolation for answering secret sharing scheme. Another
idea is based on hyperplanes which Blakley introduced it [4].
In Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme the secret is shared
by a modular arithmetic and secret would be reassembled by
Chinese remainder theorem. Mignotte secret sharing which
has some integer sequences known as Mignotte sequences is
1
2based on Chinese remainder theorem [14]. Like secret sharing
scheme, function sharing scheme needs to distribute function
computation based on function sharing scheme in a way that
each part of the calculation is done by different members.
The partial results of computations should be combined with
each other until the final output value of the function, without
revealing partners secret, (the partial calculations made by
members) be done [16]. Encryption functions and digital
signature can be used as examples for sharing functions by
using secret sharing scheme for public key algorithms like
RSA and ElGamal [7]. Also, the security of new devices
like electronic voting devices is dependent on secret sharing
functions. RSA secret system is the most used system in
public key secret system [12]. RSA signature and encryption
functions can be shared among members by Asmuth-Bloom
secret sharing system [2]. RSA threshold signature scheme
is secure, that it means the scheme is non-counterfeiting in
an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack, and in the result, RSA
function is trapdoor [12]. In this scheme it has been assumed
that adversary is static, it means he can control t−1 members.
Thsese members can be corrupted individuals and adversary
even can request the signature of messages from them but
he cannot do anything about other members which means
adversary is static.
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is a criterion for digital
signature in the USA and DSS sharing is an interesting prob-
lem which a solution has been introduced by Gennaro and et
al. based on Shamir secret sharing scheme [8]. Asmuth-Bloom
secret sharing scheme is probably the first DSS threshold
signature scheme based on Chinese remainder theorem. DSS
threshold signature scheme is secure which means is non-
counterfeiting in adaptive chosen plain-text attack [9].
Also, linear codes have been used for secret sharing. The
relation between minimal codewords of dual codes and secret
sharing has been studied [13]. Another great researches in
secret sharing by linear codes area also has been done [3].
Arikan in his paper introduced channel capacity achieving
Polar codes which in following a secret sharing scheme based
on it would be constructed.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF SUITABLE POLAR CODES FOR
SECRET SHARING
Polar codes introduced by Arikan has a construction which
is based on the channel it uses. At first Polar codes have
been used for Binary input Discrete Memoryless Symmetric
Channels (B-DMSC) and it is shown these codes can achieve
to the channel capacity by O(N log N) encoding and decoding
complexity. N is a power of 2 and is code length [1]. For
showing a B-DMSC a W : X −→ Y channel by input
alphabet X and output alphabet Y with transition probability
function W(y | x) which y ∈ Y and x ∈ X has been used. In
this paper binary input alphabet, X = {0, 1} is assumed. For
showing a channel which has been used by N times using
of W , WN : XN −→ YN notation has been used which
WN (yN
1
| xN
1
) =
∏N
i=1 W(yi |xi). For a symmetric channel W ,
the capacity is as
I(W) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
1
2
W(y | x) log
W(y | x)
1
2
W(y | 0) +
1
2
W(y | 1)
, (1)
And the Bhattacharyya parameter is defined as
Z(W) =
∑
y∈Y
√
W(y | 0)W(y | 1). (2)
Z(W) is an approximation for the reliability of the channel.
If all inputs of the channel W assumed to have the same
probability, the value of I(W) is the highest rate and Z(W) is
an upper bound for maximum-likelihood error decision which
W has been used for only one time for a 0 or 1 to the channel.
The logarithm base is 2 and both I(W) and Z(W) parameter’s
values are in [0,1] interval. It is proved that I(W) ≃ 1 if and
only if Z(W) ≃ 0 [1]. In channel polarization by using N
independent copies of B-DMSC W , N {W
(i)
N
: 1 ≤ i ≤ N}
polarized channels would be obtained. As N increases, the
capacity of these symmetric channels, except a few fractions
of them, tends to 0 or 1 and channel polarizing is done in two
steps: channel combining and channel splitting.
In channel polarizing, for achieving the symmetric channel
capacity I(W), each I(W
(i)
N
) is seen separately and those
channels which Z(W
(i)
N
) for them is near to zero would be
chosen. Set of i’s indices which Z(W
(i)
N
) for them is near to
zero is called information or unfrozen bits and this set is
shown by A. The remaining indices are called frozen bits
and is shown by Ac which Z(W
(i)
N
) for them is near to 1. In
the construction of Polar codes, a class of block codes which
contains Polar codes are used. Consider GN matrix which is
n times Kronecker product of matrix G =
[
1 0
1 1
]
. The length
of constructed codes in this way is a power of 2-i.e., N = 2n.
For a given N , any message in this class is encoded in the
same way: xN
1
= uN
1
GN . For the set of information bits A in
{1, · · · , N} the codeword is:
xN1 = uAGN (A) ⊕ uAc GN (A
c). (3)
GN (A)’s row space is a subspace of GN ’s row space which
is determined by unfrozen bits. If A and uAc considered being
fixed ( it can be assumed that uAc is zero) and uA considered
to be an arbitrary vector, a map from uA to the x
N
1
can be
obtained. This is a cosset coding: a cosset of linear block codes
by generator matrix GN (A) which every cosset is determined
by a fixed vector uAcGN (A
c). This set is called cosset codes
of GN and it is shown by (N, K,A, uAc ) parameters which K
is the dimension of the code and determines the size of A.
uAc is also called fixed bits. Polar codes can be constructed
by determining A information bits. HN , the dual code of
GN , is some rows of a matrix which can be obtained from
n times Kronecker product of matrix H =
[
1 1
0 1
]
. The rows
are chosen based on frozen bits in Ac . It can easily be
seen that hi, j = gN−1−i,N−1−j . If a row of Polar codes is
chosen based on information bit of C, that row of HN is
correspondent to a frozen bit of its dual code and vice versa.
For matrix G, a permutation pi on its rows can be defined in
3a way that G = pi(G) =
[
GF
GU
]
which GF is corresponding to
frozen bits and GU is corresponding to the unfrozen bits. In
conclusion, GT =
[
HU
HF
]
in a way that GUH
T
U
= 0. In result, a
systematic encoding for solving [xF xU ]H
T
U
= 0 is used that xU
is for information bits. Notice that permutation pi for obtaining
G = pi(G) =
[
GF
GU
]
from the initial matrix G is necessary to
be done to obtain [xF xU ].
Example 1.
H8 = G
T
8 ;
GU = G8([4 6 7 8]), :) ;
HU = H8([1 2 3 5], :) ;
=⇒ mod((GU × H
T
U ), 2) = 0.
H16 = G
T
16;
GU = G16([8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16], :) ;
HU = H16([1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9], :);
=⇒ mod((GU × H
T
U ), 2) = 0.
In Polar code generator matrix, its row weight can easily
be calculated [10]: for N = 2n, every column of matrix GN
has a weight equal to 2wH (b
j
1,b
j
2, · · · ,b
j
n ) which (b
j
1
, b
j
2
, · · · , b
j
n)
is binary expansion of j − 1 and b
j
i = b
j
i
⊕ 1. For example,
weights of some codewords are as table I.
Table I
COLUMN WEIGHTS OF G8
column j j-1 (b
j
1
, b
j
2
, b
j
3
) (b
j
1, b
j
2, b
j
3) weight
1 0 (0 0 0) (1 1 1) 8
2 1 (0 0 1) (1 1 0) 4
3 2 (0 1 0) (1 0 1) 4
4 3 (0 1 1) (1 0 0) 2
5 4 (1 0 0) (0 1 1) 4
6 5 (1 0 1) (0 1 0) 2
7 6 (1 1 0) (0 0 1) 2
8 7 (1 1 1) (0 0 0) 1
IV. POLAR CODE BASED SECRET SHARING
In secret sharing, binary codes can be as goos as non-binary
codes. Notice that any secret space can be encoded to other
secret space which every secret is a binary stream by finite
length.
The length of any binary stream can be fixed or be variable.
For this reason, for using Polar codes, it is assumed that secret
space is a binary stream. Because of that, the secret can be
shared among a group of members as a bit and reconstructed
bit by bit by the share of any member. In result, it is assumed
that secret space is {0, 1}. For simplicity, in this paper secret
can take 0 and 1 values by same probability. Consider a binary
(N, k) Polar code which N = 2n is the code length and code
is obtained by n times using of W channel. k is the size of
unfrozen set and G = (g1, · · · , gN ) is the generator matrix
of Polar code. Fix index p in A which would be used in
constructing secret from Polar code. We have secret s ∈ {0, 1}
and P1, · · · , Pw members that w ≤ k. For secret sharing, a
random vector u = (u1, · · · , uk) ∈ F
k
2
is chosen in a way
that s = ugp. Dealer uses u as information vector and would
compute codeword t = (t1, · · · , tN ) = uG. The dealer gives ti to
the Pi member which i ∈ A and i , p. It can be calculated that
tp = ugp = s. A set of {ti1, ti2, · · · , tim } shares would determine
secret s if and only if gp be a combination of gi1, · · · , gim
values. In other words, a set of ti1, ti2, · · · , tim shares can
determine the value of secret if and only if there is a codeword
(0, 0, . . . , 0, ci1, 0, · · · , 1, · · · , cim, 0, · · · , 0) in dual code of polar
code which its p element is 1. In result, gp =
∑m
j=1 xjgij is
obtained and xj ∈ F2 and s =
∑m
j=1 xj tij .
A group of members is called minimal access set if they
can compute secret by their shares and any proper subset of
it would not be able to find access to the secret. Support of a
c ∈ FN
2
vector is defined as {1 ≤ i ≤ N : ci , 0}. A codeword
c2 covers codeword c1 if support of c2 contains support of c1.
A codeword is called minimal if it covers only its coefficients
and does not cover any other nonzero vector. If p’s element
of a codeword is 1, it is called minimal p-codeword.
Theorem 1. Suppose C is an (N, k) Polar code by G =
(g1, · · · , gN ) as its generator matrix which any nonzero code-
word of C is a minimal vector. In secret sharing based on the
dual code, totally there are 2k−1 minimal access sets and if
the gi is a multiplication of gp for 1 ≤ i ≤ N which i , p,
member Pi should be in any minimal access set. This member
is called a dictator member. Also, if the gi is a multiplication
of gp for 1 ≤ i ≤ N which i , p, Pi member should be in
2k−2 from 2k−1 minimal elements sets.
A more general proof of this theorem there is in [6]. Based
on this theorem, it is better to construct codes which any
nonzero codeword be a minimal vector. If weights of a linear
code are close to each other, from the next theorem it can be
concluded that every nonzero codeword is minimal.
Theorem 2. In (N, k) code C, suppose that wmin and wmax
are minimum and maximum weights, respectively. If
wmin
wmax
>
1
2
, every nonzero codeword of C is minimal.
Based on this theorem [6], those rows of GN can be chosen
which have weights near to each other:
G8 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

4The result code is as:
x = [00010110]G8.
In the following two examples of secret sharing scheme
constructed by (8, 4) and (32, 16) Polar codes which secret
is computed by gp are given. A coalition of each one for
rebuilding secret is introduced.
Example 2. We are looking for a secret sharing scheme based
on a Polar code by a length of 8 and dimension of 4. Suppose
the channel is BEC(1/2). Values of Z(W
(i)
N
)s are as follows:
0.9961, 0.8789, 0.8086, 0.3164, 0.6836, 0.1914, 0.1211,
0.0039.
Because k = 4, four values of Z(W
(i)
N
)s which is fewer than
others are specified by blue color and those are in positions
4, 6, 7, 8. So A = {4, 6, 7, 8} is the information set and GU
matrix is defined based on it. GU and HU matrices by their
row’s weights are shown in tables II and III.
Table II
GU MATRIX AND ITS ROW WEIGHTS
GU rows row weights
[1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0] 4
[1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0] 4
[1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0] 4
[1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1] 8
Table III
HU MATRIX AND ITS ROW WEIGHTS
HU rows row weights
[1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1] 8
[0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1] 4
[0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1] 4
[0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1] 4
In secret sharing based on this code, index p is fixed.
So for a random vector u = (0, 0, 0, u4, 0, u6, u7, u8), secret
is s = ugp. Dealer uses this u as information vector and
obtains codeword t = (t1, · · · , t8) = uG and by using BEC,
he sends t1, · · · , t8 shares to the P1, · · · , P8 members which
P1, P2, P3, P4 are called imaginary members. If we determine
p = 8, for rebuilding secret a coalition of at least three
members is necessary which can be one of the {P1, · · · , P7},
{P2, P4, P6}, {P3, P4, P7}, or {P5, P6, P7} coalitions. Because
actually received shares for imaginary four P1, P2, P3, P5 mem-
bers are fixed, by a coalition of two members of {P4, P6},
{P4, P7}, or {P6, P7} the secret can be calculated. If p , N ,
PN would be a dictator member and should be present in any
coalition. It can be practical when an administrator should be
present in any important meeting.
Example 3. A secret sharing scheme based on Polar codes
with length of 32 and dimension of 16 on AWGN channel
which σ = 0.9 would be constructed. For this code, values of
Z(W
(i)
N
) are as:
1, 0.9999, 0.9998, 0.9623, 0.9987, 0.9315, 0.8914, 0.502,
0.9937, 0.8685, 0.8065, 0.3584, 0.7134, 0.2505, 0.1803,
0.01, 0.9755, 0.7529, 0.6673, 0.2083, 0.5559, 0.1309, 0.0878,
0.0022, 0.4281, 0.0704, 0.0451, 0.0006, 0.027, 0.0002, 0.0001,
0.
Because k=16, information set is A =
{12, 14, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32}.
Based on information bits, GU would be constructed.
For secret sharing scheme based on this code, if we fix
p = 32, according to random vector u = (u12, u14, u15,
u16, u20, u22, u23, u24, u25, u26, u27, u28, u29, u30, u31, u32), secret
is s = ugp. Dealer uses u as information vector and obtains
codeword t = (t1, · · · , t32) = uG, and by using binary input
AWGN channels, gives ti to the member Pi which i ∈ A and
i , p. Coalitions based on each row of matrix HU is given in
table IV.
Table IV
HU MATRIX AND ITS ROW WEIGHTS
row coalition of members to rebuild secret
1 P12, P14, P15, P16, P20, P22, · · · , P31
2 P12, P14, P16, P20, P22, P24, P26, P24, P28, P30
3 P12, P15, P16, P20, P23, P24, P27, P28, P31
4 P12, P16, P20, P24, P28
5 P14, P15, P16, P22, P23, P24, P29, P30, P31
6 P14, P16, P22, P24, P30
7 P15, P16, P23, P24, P31
8 P16, P24
9 P12, P14, P15, P16, P25, P27, · · · , P31
10 P12, P14, P16, P26, P28, P30
11 P12, P15, P16, P27, P28, P31
12 P14, P15, P16, P29, P30, P31
13 P20, P22, · · · , P31
14 P20, P22, P24, P26, P28, P30
15 P20, P23, P24, P27, P28, P31
16 P21, · · · , P31
For Polar codes with greater length, those indices of in-
formation bits which for them codeword’s weights are equal
to each other can be chosen. By this way, all members
would have equal access set and the secret sharing would be
democratic.
5V. CONCLUSION
To protect a secret, secret sharing among members can
be done. In secret sharing scheme, only a specified union
of members can reconstruct secret. Considering Polar codes
structure, a dealer can use the secret sharing based on Polar
codes to send their shares in the channel which code is built
on it. By using Polar codes, members can decode their shares
reliably.
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